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Abstract—This paper aims to boost privacy-preserving visual recognition, an increasingly demanded feature in smart camera
applications, using deep learning. We formulate a unique adversarial training framework, that learns a degradation transform for the
original video inputs, in order to explicitly optimize the trade-off between target task performance and the associated privacy budgets
on the degraded video. We carefully analyze and benchmark three different optimization strategies to train the resulting model. Notably,
the privacy budget, often defined and measured in task-driven contexts, cannot be reliably indicated using any single model
performance, because a strong protection of privacy has to sustain against any possible model that tries to hack privacy information. In
order to tackle this problem, we propose two strategies: model restarting and model ensemble, which can be easily plug-and-play into
our training algorithms and further improve the performance. Extensive experiments have been carried out and analyzed.
On the other hand, few public datasets are available with both utility and privacy labels provided, making the power of data-driven
(supervised) learning not yet fully unleashed on this task. We first discuss an innovative heuristic of cross-dataset training and
evaluation, that jointly utilizes two datasets with target task and privacy labels respectively, for adversarial training. To further alleviate
this challenge, we have constructed a new dataset, termed PA-HMDB51, with both target task (action) and selected privacy attributes
(gender, age, race, nudity, and relationship) labeled on a frame-wise basis. This first-of-its-kind video dataset further validates the
effectiveness of our proposed framework, and opens up new opportunities for the research community. Our codes, models, and the
PA-HMDB51 dataset will be made all available at: https://github.com/htwang14/PA-HMDB51.
Index Terms—Visual privacy, action recognition, privacy-preserving learning, adversarial learning.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
SMART surveillance or smart home cameras, such asAmazon Echo and Nest Cam, are now found in millions
of locations to remotely link users to their homes or offices,
providing monitoring services to enhance security and/or
notify environment changes, as well as lifelogging and
intelligent services. The convenience and benefits, however,
come at the heavy price of privacy intrusion from time
to time. Due to their computationally demanding nature,
not all visual recognition tasks can be run the resource-
limited local device end, making transmitting (part of) data
to the cloud indispensable. However, users have expressed
growing concerns towards the abuse of their uploaded data,
by the cloud service provider - a potentially malicious au-
thorized party. That is different from the traditional privacy
concerns, which mostly arise from the unsecured channel
between cloud and device (e.g, malicious third-party eaves-
dropping), therefore demanding new solutions.
Is it at all possible to alleviate the privacy concerns,
without compromising on user convenience? At the first
glance, the question itself is posed as a dilemma: we would
like a camera system to recognize important events and
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assist human daily life by understanding its videos, while
preventing it from obtaining sensitive visual information
(such as faces, gender, skin color, etc.) that can intrude
individual privacy. It thus becomes a new and appealing
problem, to find an appropriate transform to “sanitize”
the collected raw visual data at the local end, so that the
transformed data itself will only enable certain target tasks
while obstructing undesired privacy-related tasks. Recently,
some new video acquisition approaches [1]–[3] proposed
to intentionally capture or process videos in extremely
low-resolution to create privacy-preserving ”anonymized
videos”, and showed promising empirical results.
This paper seeks to take a first step towards address-
ing this brand new challenge of privacy-preserving visual
recognition, via the following multi-fold contributions:
• A General Adversarial Training and Evaluation Frame-
work. We formulate the privacy-preserving visual recog-
nition in a unique adversarial training framework. The
framework explicitly optimizes the trade-off between tar-
get task performance and associated privacy budgets,
by learning a transform from the original videos to
anonymized videos. To mitigate the training instability,
we then carefully design and experimentally compare
three different optimization strategies. We eventually de-
fine a novel two-fold protocol, to evaluate the trained
models in terms of not only the utility, but also the privacy
protection generalizability against unseen privacy hackers.
• Practical Approximations of “Universal” Privacy Pro-
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2tection. The privacy budget in our framework cannot be
simply defined w.r.t. one single privacy attribute predic-
tion model, as the ideal protection of privacy has to be
universal and model-agnostic, i.e., obstructing every pos-
sible attacker model from predicting privacy information.
To resolve the so-called “∀ challenge”, we propose two
strategies, i.e., restarting and ensembling, to enhance the
generalization capability of the learned degradation to
defend against unseen models.
• A New Dataset for this New Problem. There are few
off-the-shelf datasets that have both utility and privacy
attribute annotations. To alleviate the lack of appropriate
training data, we (in our previous work [4]) introduce a
“cross-dataset training” alternative, based on the hypoth-
esis that privacy attributes have good “transferability”.
In this paper, we construct the very first dataset named
PA-HMDB51 (Privacy Attribute HMDB51), for the task
of privacy-preserving action recognition from video. The
dataset consists of 580 videos originally from HMDB51.
For each video, we have annotated both utility (action)
and privacy (five attributes including skin color, face,
gender, nudity and relationship) labels on a frame-wise
basis. We benchmark our proposed framework on the new
PA-HMDB51 and validate its effectiveness.
The paper is a significant extension from the previous con-
ference version [4]. We have included: (1) a detailed discus-
sion and comparison on three optimization strategies for the
proposed framework (only one heuristic was presented in
[4]); (2) a much expanded experimental and analysis section;
and most importantly (3) the construction of the new PA-
HMDB51 dataset, and the associated benchmarking efforts.
2 RELATED WORK
2.1 Privacy Protection in Computer Vision
With pervasive camera for surveillance or smart home de-
vices, privacy-preserving visual recognition has draw in-
creasing interests from both industry and academia. Most
classical cryptographic solutions secure the communication
against unauthorized access from attackers. However, they
are not immediately applicable to preventing authorized
agents (such as the backend analytics) from the unau-
thorized abuse of information, that causes privacy breach
concerns. A few encryption based solutions, such as Ho-
momorphic Encryption (HE) [5], [6], were developed to
locally encrypt visual information. The server can only get
access to the enciphered data and conduct utility task on
it. However, many encryption based solutions will incur
high computational costs at the local platforms. It is also
challenging to generalize the cryptosystems to more com-
plicated classifiers. [7] combined the detection of regions
of interest and the real encryption techniques to improve
privacy while allowing general surveillance to continue. A
seemingly reasonable, and computationally cheaper option
is to extract feature descriptors from raw images, and trans-
mit those features only. Unfortunately, a previous study [8]
revealed that considerable details of original images could
still be recovered from standard HOG or SIFT features (even
they look visually distinct from natural images).
An alternative toward a privacy-preserving vision sys-
tem concerns the concept of anonymized videos. Such
videos are intentionally captured or processed to be in
special low quality conditions, that only allow for the recog-
nition of some target events or activities, while avoiding the
unwanted leak of the identity information for the human
subjects in the video [1]–[3]. [1] showed that even at the
extreme low resolutions, reliable action recognition could
be achieved by learning appropriate downsampling trans-
forms, with neither unrealistic activity-location assump-
tions nor extra specific hardware resources. The authors
empirically verified that conventional face recognition eas-
ily failed on the generated low-resolution videos. [2] uses
image operations like blurring and superpixel clustering
to get anonymized videos while [3] uses low resolution
camera hardware to get extreme low resolution (e.g., 16∗12)
videos as anonymized videos. [9] uses cartoon-like effects
with a customized version of mean shift filtering. [10], [11]
proposed to use privacy preserving optics to filter sensi-
tive information from the incident light-field before sensor
measurements are made, by k-anonymity and defocus blur.
Earlier work [12] explored privacy-preserving tracking and
coarse pose estimation using a network of ceiling-mounted
time-of-flight low-resolution sensors. [13] adopted a net-
work of ceiling-mounted binary passive infrared sensors.
However, both works [12], [13] handled only a limited set
of activities performed at specific constrained areas in the
room. The usage of low-resolution anonymized videos [1],
[3] is computationally cheaper, and is also compatible with
sensor and bandwidth constraints. However, [1], [3] remain
empirical in protecting privacy. In particular, neither were
their models learned towards protecting any visual privacy,
nor were the privacy-preserving effects carefully analyzed
and evaluated. In other words, privacy protection in [1],
[3] came as a ”side product” of down-sampling, and was
not a result of any optimization. The authors of [1], [3] also
did not extend their efforts to studying deep learning-based
recognition, making their task performance less competitive.
The recent progress of low-resolution object recognition [14],
[15] also put their privacy protection effects in jeopardy.
2.2 Privacy Protection in Social Media/Photo Sharing
User privacy protection is also a topic of extensive interests
in the social media field, especially for photo sharing. The
most common means to protect user privacy in a uploaded
photo is to add empirical obfuscations, such as blurring, mo-
saicing or cropping out certain regions (usually faces) [16].
However, extensive research showed that such an empirical
means can be easily hacked too [17], [18]. A latest work
[19] described a game-theoretical system in which the photo
owner and the recognition model strive for antagonistic
goals of dis-enabling recognition, and better obfuscation
ways could be learned from their competition. However,
it was only designed to confuse one specific recognition
model, via finding its adversarial perturbations. That can
caused obvious overfitting as simply changing to another
recognition model will likely put the learning efforts in vain:
such perturbations even cannot protect privacy from human
eyes. Their problem setting thus deviated far away from
our target problem. Another notable difference is that in
social photo sharing, we usually hope to cause minimum
perceptual quality loss to those photos, after applying any
3privacy-preserving transform to them. The same concern
does not exist in our scenario, allowing us to explore much
more free, even aggressive image distortions.
A useful resource to us was found in [20], which defined
concrete privacy attributes and correlated them to image
content. The authors categorized possible private informa-
tion in images, and then run a user study to understand the
privacy preferences. They then provided a sizable set of 22k
images annotated with 68 privacy attributes, on which they
trained privacy attribute predictors.
3 METHOD
3.1 Problem definition
Assume our training data X (raw visual data captured by
camera) are associated with a target task T and a privacy
budget B. Since T is usually a supervised task, e.g. action
recognition or visual tracking, a label set YT is provided on
X , and a standard cost function LT (e.g. cross-entropy) is
defined to evaluate the task performance on T . And usually
there is a state-of-the-art deep neural network fT which
takes X as input and predicts the target labels. On the
other hand, we need to define a budget cost function JB
to evaluate the privacy leakage of its input data: the smaller
JB(·) is, the less privacy information its input contains.
We seek an optimal degradation function f∗D to trans-
form the original X to f∗D(X) as the common input for both
fT and fB , and an optimal target model f∗T such that:
• f∗D has filtered out the privacy information contained
in X , i.e.
JB(f
∗
D(X)) JB(X)
• the performance of fT is minimally affected when
using the degraded visual data f∗D(X) compared to
when using the original data X , i.e.
LT (f
∗
T (f
∗
D(X)), YT ) ' min
fT
LT (fT (X), YT )
To achieve these two goals, we mathematically formulate
the problem as solving the following optimization problem:
f∗T , f
∗
D = argmin
fT ,fD
[LT (fT (fD(X)), YT )+
γJB(fD(X))]
(1)
The definition of the privacy budget cost JB is not
straightforward. Practically, it needs to be placed in con-
crete application contexts, often in a task-driven way. For
example, in smart workplaces or smart homes with video
surveillance, one might often want to avoid a disclosure of
the face or identity of persons. Therefore, to reduce JB could
be interpreted as to suppress the success rate of identity
recognition or verification. Other privacy-related attributes,
such as race, gender, or age, can be similarly defined too.
We denote the privacy-related annotations (such as identity
label) as YB , and rewrite JB(·) as JB(fB(·), YB), where fB
denotes the budget model who takes (degraded or original)
visual data as input and predicts the corresponding privacy
information. Different from LT , minimizing JB will encour-
age fB(·) to diverge from YB .
Such a supervised, task-driven definition of JB poses
at least two challenges: (1) Dataset challenge: The privacy
budget-related annotations, denoted as YB , often have less
availability than target task labels. Specifically, it is often
challenging to have both YT and YB ready on the same X ;
(2) ∀ challenge: Considering the nature of privacy protec-
tion, it is not sufficient to merely suppress the success rate of
one fB model. Instead, define a privacy prediction function
family P : fD(X) 7→ YB , the ideal privacy protection of
fD should be reflected as suppressing every possible model
fD from P . That diverts from the common supervised
training goal, where only one model needs to be found to
successfully fulfill the target task.
We address the Dataset challenge by two ways: (1)
cross dataset training and validation: see section 3.6; and
more importantly (2) building a new dataset containing
both utility and privacy labels: see section 5. We defer their
discussion to respective experimental paragraphs.
Handling the ∀ challenge is more challenging. First we
re-write the general form 1 with the task-driven definition
of LB as follows:
f∗T , f
∗
D = argmin
fT ,fD
[LT (fT (fD(X)), YT )+
γ sup
fB∈P
JB(fB(fD(X)), YB)]
(2)
The ∀ challenge in essence is the infeasibility to directly
solve 2, due to the existence of the superior operation. So
we propose to solve the following problem instead:
θ∗T , θ
∗
D = argmin
θT ,θD
[LT (fT (fD(X)), YT )+
γmax
θB
JB(fB(fD(X)), YB)]
(3)
where fB has a fixed form and is parameterized by θB .
Similarly, fD and fT are parameterized by θD and θT
correspondingly. Note that problem 3 is a pretty wild ap-
proximation to problem 2. But experimental results demon-
strate that optimizing equation 3 can already achieve results
much better than the baseline methods. We further propose
”model ensemble” and ”model restarting” (see section 3.4)
to handle the ∀ challenge better and further boost the
experimental results.
Without loss of generality, we assume both fT and fB to
be classification models and output class labels. To optimize
the target task performance, LT could be simply chosen as
the KL divergence: KL(fT (fd(X))||YT ). Definition of JB ,
however, is not as trivial. We discuss different forms of
JB , and correspondingly different optimization strategies,
in sections 3.3.1-3.3.3.
3.2 Basic framework
Figure 1 depicts the basic framework implementing the
proposed formulation 2. The framework consists three parts:
the degradation model fD, the target model fT and the
budget model fB . fD takes raw video X as input, filters
out privacy information contained in X and outputs the
anonymized video fD(X). fT takes fD(X) as input and
carries out the target task. fB also take fD(X) as input
and try to predict the privacy information from fD(X). All
three models are implemented with deep neural networks
4min(𝐿𝑇−𝛾𝐿𝐵)
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Fig. 1. Basic adversarial training framework for privacy-preserving visual
recognition.
and their parameters are learnable during the training pro-
cedure. The entire pipeline is trained under the guidance of
the hybrid loss of LT and JB . The goal of the training proce-
dure is to find a degradation model which can filter out the
privacy information contained in the original video while
keeping useful information for the utility task, and to find a
target model which can achieve good performance on target
task using degraded videos fD(X). Similar frameworks
have been used in feature disentanglement [21] [22] [23]
[24]. After training, the learned degradation model can be
applied on local device (e.g. smart camera). We can convert
raw video to degraded video locally and only transfer the
degraded video through Internet to the backend (e.g. cloud)
for target task analysis, so that the privacy information
contained in the raw videos will be invisible on the backend.
Specifically, fD is implemented using the model in [25],
which can be taken as a 2D convolution based frame-level
filter. In other words, fD converts each frame in X into a
feature map of the same shape as the original frame. We
use state-of-the-art human action recognition model C3D
[26] as fT and state-of-the-art image classification models,
such as ResNet [27] and MobileNet [28], as fB . Since the
action recognition model we use is C3D, we need to split
the videos into clips with fixed frame number. Each clip is
4D tensor of shape [T,W,H,C], where T is the number of
frames in each clip and W , H , C are the width, height and
color channel number of each frame correspondingly. Unlike
fT who takes a 4D tensor as an input data sample, fB takes
a 3D tensor (i.e. a frame) as input. We average the logits over
the temporal dimension of each video clip to calculate JB
and predict the budget task label.
3.3 Optimization Strategies
Similar to GANs [29], our model is prone to collapse and
get stuck at bad local minimums during training. We thus
carefully designed three different optimization schemes to
solve this hard optimization problem.
3.3.1 Gradient reverse layer (GRL)
We can consider problem 3 as a saddle point problem:
θ∗D, θ
∗
T = argmin
θD,θT
L(θD, θT , θ
∗
B)
θ∗B = argmax
θB
L(θ∗D, θ
∗
T , θB)
where L(θD, θT , θB) = LT − γLB and LB = −JB =
KL(fB(fD(X))||YB) is KL divergence loss function.
GRL [30] is a state-of-the-art algorithm to solve such a
saddle point problem. The underlying mathematical gist is
simply solving the problem by following these update rules,
θD ← θD − αD ∗ ∇θD (LT − γLB) (4a)
θT ← θT − αT ∗ ∇θTLT (4b)
θB ← θB − αB ∗ ∇θBLB (4c)
We denote this method as Ours-KL in the following
parts and the formal description is in algorithm 1
Algorithm 1: Ours-KL algorithm
Input: Target labels YT , Budget labels YB , visual data
X , step size αT , αB , αD, accuracy threshhold
th1, th2, maximum iteration max iter
Output: Degradation model parameter θD , target
model parameter θT and budget model
parameter θB
1 initialize θD , θT and θB ;
2 for i← 1 to max iter do
3 Update θD using equation 4a
4 while target task validation accuracy ≤ th1 do
5 Update θT using equation 4b
6 end
7 while budget task training accuracy ≤ th2 do
8 Update θB using equation 4c
9 end
10 end
3.3.2 Maximize entropy
Updating θD to maximize cross-entropy loss LB might
not be the best choice in our setting. We don’t need the
budget model to misclassify data to a false class with high
confidence. For example, if a sample has ground truth label
[1, 0, 0, 0], one of the global optimum for maximizing LB is
fB(fD(X)) = [0, 1, 0, 0]. We don’t need fD to go that far
to this point so that fB will misclassify this training sample
with high confidence. Instead, a more reasonable output for
fB(fD(X)) is somewhere near [0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25], which
means fD has filtered most information that is necessary for
the budget task. Based on these intuitions, we formulate a
new optimization scheme:
θD ← θD − αD ∗ ∇θD (LT − γHB)
θT ← θT − αT ∗ ∇θTLT
θB ← θB − αB ∗ ∇θBLB
where LT and LB are still KL divergence loss functions as
in equation 4, and HB = H(fB(fD(X))) is the entropy of
fB(fD(X)).
In practice, we update θT and θD in an end-to-end way
when minimizingLT . That’s to say, the optimization scheme
is actually as follows:
θD ← θD − αD ∗ ∇θD (LT − γHB) (6a)
θT , θD ← θT , θD − αT ∗ ∇θT ,θDLT (6b)
θB ← θB − αB ∗ ∇θBLB (6c)
5We denote this method as Ours-Entropy in the following
parts and the formal description is in algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Ours-Entropy algorithm
Input: Target labels YT , Budget labels YB , visual data
X , step size αT , αB , αD, accuracy threshhold
th1, th2, maximum iteration max iter
Output: Degradation model parameter θD , target
model parameter θT and budget model
parameter θB
1 initialize θD , θT and θB ;
2 for i← 1 to max iter do
3 Update θD using equation 6a
4 while target task validation accuracy ≤ th1 do
5 Update θT , θD using equation 6b
6 end
7 while budget task training accuracy ≤ th2 do
8 Update θB using equation 6c
9 end
10 end
3.3.3 Alternative optimization of two loss functions
The goal in equation 3 can also be formulated as alterna-
tively solving the following two optimization problems:
min
θD,θT
LT (fT (fD(X)), YT )
min
θB
max
θD
LB(fB(fD(X)), YB)
With a little abuse of notations, we rewrite these two loss
functions in terms of neural network parameters:
min
θD,θT
LT (θD, θT ) (8a)
min
θB
max
θD
LB(θD, θB) (8b)
Equation 8a is an ordinary minimization problem which can
be solved by training fD and fT in an end-to-end fashion.
Equation 8b is a minimax problem which we solve by
the recent state-of-the-art minimax algorithm K-beam [31].
K-beam keeps tracking K different sets of budget model
parameters, denoted as {θB , i}Ki=1, during training time and
alternatively updates θD and {θB,i}Ki=1. More specifically,
each iteration of the training procedure can be divided into
two phases: Min step and Max step. Suppose at the t-th
iteration, the parameter of degradation and budget models
are θtD and {θtB,i}Ki=1 correspondingly. During Max step,
it first select θB,j where j = argmini∈1,...,M LB(θ
t
D, θ
t
B,i)
and update θD using gradient descend on LB(θD, θtB,i) to
get θt+1D . During Min step, it updates all K budget model
parameters separately by gradient descend on LD(θt+1D , θB)
to get {θt+1B,i }Ki=1. We suggest the readers to refer to the
original paper for more details.
Based on K-beam algorithm, we design algorithm 3 to
alternatively solve the two loss functions in equation 8: We
denote this method as Ours-K-beam in the following parts.
3.4 Addressing the ∀ Challenge
To improve the generalization ability of learned fD over all
possible fB ∈ P (i.e, privacy cannot be reliably predicted
Algorithm 3: Ours-K-beam algorithm
Input: Target labels YT , Budget labels YB , visual data
X , step size αT , αB , αD, budget model beam
number K , accuracy thresholds th1, th2,
number of iteration max iter, d iter
Output: Degradation model parameter θD , target
model parameter θT and budget model
parameter θB
1 initialize θD , θT and {θB,i}Ki=1;
2 for t← 1 to max iter do
3 LB Max step:
4 j = argmini∈1,...,M LB(θD, θB,i)
5 for i← 1 to d iter do
6 θD ← θD + αD ∗ ∇θDLB(θD, θB,j)
7 end
8 LB Min step:
9 for k ← 1 to K do
10 while budget task training accuracy ≤ th2 do
11 θB,i ← θB,i − αB ∗ ∇θBLB(θD, θB,i)
12 end
13 end
14 LT step:
15 while target task validation accuracy ≤ th1 do
16 θT , θD ← θT , θD − αT ∗ ∇θT ,θDLT (θD, θT )
17 end
18 end
by any model), we hereby discuss two simple and easy-
to-implement options. Other more sophisticated model re-
sampling or model search approaches, such as [32], will be
explored in future work.
3.4.1 Budget Model Restarting
At certain point of training (e.g., when the privacy budget
LB(fB(fD(X))) stops decreasing any further), we replace
the current weights in fB with random weights. Such a ran-
dom re-starting aims to avoid trivial overfitting between fB
and fD (i.e., fD is only specialized at confusing the current
fB), without incurring more parameters. We then start to
train the new model fB to be a strong competitor, w.r.t.
the current fD(X): specifically, we freeze the training of fD
and fT , and change to minimizing KL(fB(fD(X))||YB),
until the new fB has been trained from scratch to become
a strong privacy prediction model over current fD(X). We
then resume adversarial training by unfreezing fD and fT ,
as well as replacing the loss for fB back to the negative
entropy. It can repeat several times.
3.4.2 Budget Model Ensemble
The other strategy proposes to approximate the continuous
P with a discrete set of M sample functions. Assuming the
budget model ensemble {f ib}Mi=1, we turn to minimizing the
following discretized surrogate of 2:
θ∗T , θ
∗
D = argmin
θT ,θD
[LT (fT (fD(X)), YT )+
γ max
i=1,...,M
max
θiB
JB(f
i
B(fD(X)), YB)]
(9)
6The previous basic framework is a special case of equation 9
with M = 1. The ensemble strategy can be easily combined
with re-starting.
3.4.3 Combine Budget Model Restarting and Budget
Model Ensemble with Ours-Entropy
Budget Model Restarting and Budget Model Ensemble can
be easily combined with all three optimization schemes
described in section 3.3.1-3.3.3. We take Ours-Entropy as an
example here.
When model ensemble is used, we denote LB,i :=
KL(fB,i(fD(X))||YB), HB,i := H(fB,i(fD(X))) and take
HB := mini∈{1,...,M}HB,i in equation 6a. That’s to say
we only suppress the model fB,i with the largest privacy
leakage JB , e.g. the ”most confident” one about its current
privacy prediction, when updating degradation model. But
we still update all M budget models in equation 6c. So the
parameter updating scheme is:
θD ← θD − αD ∗ ∇θD (LT − γ min
i∈{1,...,M}
HB,i) (10a)
θT , θD ← θT , θD − αT ∗ ∇θT ,θDLT (10b)
θB,i ← θB,i − αB ∗ ∇θB,iLB,i, i = 1, . . . ,M (10c)
The formal description of Ours-Entropy algorithm with
model restarting/ensemble is given in algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4: Ours-Entropy algorithm (with model
restarting and model ensemble)
Input: Target labels YT , Budget labels YB , visual data
X , step size αT , αB , αD, model ensemble
number M , accuracy threshold th1, th2,
maximum iteration max iter, restarting
iteration restarting iter.
Output: Degradation model parameter θD , target
model parameter θT and budget model
parameter θB
1 initialize θD , θT and θB ;
2 for i← 1 to max iter do
3 if i ≡ 0 (mod restarting iter) then
4 Reinitialize {θB,i}Mi=1
5 end
6 Update θD using equation 10a
7 while target task validation accuracy ≤ th1 do
8 Update θT , θD using equation 10b
9 end
10 for j ← 1 toM do
11 while budget task training accuracy ≤ th2 do
12 Update θB,i using equation 10c
13 end
14 end
15 end
3.5 Two-Fold Evaluation Protocol
As a balance between two task models, the evaluation pro-
tocol for privacy-preserving visual recognition is inevitably
more intricate than classical visual recognition tasks.
After we get fD , fT and fD by solving problem 3, we
need to evaluate the performance in two folds: (1) whether
the learned target task model maintains satisfactory perfor-
mance on degraded videos; (2) whether the performance of
an arbitrary privacy prediction model on degraded videos
will deteriorate. Suppose we have training dataset Xt with
target and budget task ground truth labels Y tT and Y
t
B
and evaluation dataset Xe with target and budget task
ground truth labels Y eT and Y
e
B . The first fold can follow the
traditional evaluation routine: compare fT (fD(X)) with Y eT
to get the evaluation accuracy on target task, denoted asAT ,
which we expect to be as high as possible.
For the second fold, it is apparently insufficient if we
only observe that the learned fD and fB lead to poor
classification accuracy onXe, because of the ∀ challenge: the
attacker can select any budget model to try to steal privacy
information from degraded videos fD(X). To empirically
verify that fD prohibits reliable privacy prediction for other
possible budget models, we propose a novel procedure: we
randomly re-sample N models {f jB}Nj=1 from P . Then we
train these N models on degraded training videos fD(Xt)
to make correct predictions on privacy information, i.e.
minfjB
LB(f
j
B(fD(X
t)), Y tB) for j ∈ 1, . . . , N . (Note that
fD is fixed during this training procedure.) After that, we
apply each f jB on degraded evaluation videos fD(X
e) and
compare the outputs f jB(fD(X
e)) with Y eT to get evaluation
budget accuracy of the j-th budget model. We select the
highest accuracy among all N budget models and use it as
the final budget accuracy ANB , which we expect to be as low
as possible.
3.6 Cross-Dataset Training and Evaluation: An initial
step towards alleviating the dataset challenge
An ideal dataset to train our framework would be, for
example, a set of human action videos with both action class
and privacy attributes labeled. However, to the best of our
knowledge, no public dataset well satisfies this condition.
We propose to use cross-dataset training and evaluation as
a workaround method, details of which can be found in sec-
tion 3.6. In brief, we train action recognition (target task) on
human action datasets, such as UCF101 [33] and HMDB51
[34], and train privacy protection (budget task) on visual
privacy dataset VISPR [20], while letting the two interact via
their shared component - the learned degradation model.
More specifically, during training, we have two
pipelines: one is fD + fT trained on UCF101 or HMDB51 for
action recognition; the other is fD + fB trained on VISPR
to suppress multiple privacy attribute prediction. The two
pipelines share the same parameters for fD. The initial-
ization and alternating training strategy remain unchanged
from SBU experiments, as shown in algorithm 2. During
evaluation, we perform the first part of two-fold evaluation,
i.e. action recognition, on UCF101 or HMDB51 testing set.
We then evaluate privacy protection performance of N
budget models using the VISPR testing sets. Such cross-
dataset training and evaluation sheds new possibilities on
training privacy-preserving recognition models, even under
the practical shortages of datasets that have been annotated
for both tasks.
Beyond this initial step forward, we further construct
a new datatset dedicated to the privacy-preserving visual
recognition task. It will be presented in section 5.
74 SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS
We show the effectiveness of our framework on privacy-
preserving action recognition on existing datasets. The target
task is human action recognition since it is a highly de-
manded feature in smart home and smart workplace ap-
plication. Experiments are carried out on three widely used
human action recognition datasets: SBU Kinect Interaction
Dataset [35], UCF101 [33] and HMDB51 [34]. The budget
task varies in different settings. In the experiments on SBU
dataset, the budget task is to prevent the videos leaking
human identity information. In the experiments on UCF101
and HMDB51, the budget task is to protect visual privacy
attributes as defined in [20]. We emphasize that general
framework proposed in section 3.2 can be used for a large
variety of target task and budget task combinations, not only
limited to these two settings mentioned above.
4.1 Identity-Preserving Action Recognition on SBU:
Single-Dataset Training
We compare our framework with three baseline methods
proposed in [1] and [16] to show our methods’ signifi-
cant superiority in balancing privacy protection and model
utility. We use three different optimization schemes as de-
scribed in section 3.3.1-3.3.3 on our framework and em-
pirically shows all three largely outperform the baseline
methods. We also show that adding the model ensemble
and model restarting, as described in section 3.4, to the op-
timization procedure can further improve the performance
of our method.
4.1.1 Dataset and Problem Setting
SBU Kinect Interaction Dataset [35] is a two-person in-
teraction dataset for video-based action recognition. Seven
participants performed actions and the dataset is composed
of 21 sets, each containing videos of a pair of different
persons performing all 8 interactions. However, some sets
contain the same two actors but with different person acting
and reacting. For example, in set 1, actor 1 is acting and actor
2 is reacting; in set 4, actor 2 is acting and actor 1 is reacting.
These two sets have the same actors, so we combine them as
one single class to fit with our experimental setting better.
In this way, we combine all sets with the same actors and
finally get 13 different actor pairs. The target task on this
dataset is action recognition, which could be taken as a
classification task with 8 different classes. The budget task
is to recognize the actor pairs of the videos, which could
be taken as a classification task with 13 different classes.
Following the notations in section 3.2, in this dataset, we
have W = 112, H = 112, C = 3, and we set T = 16. Note
that the original resolution for SBU is 640 ∗ 480. We first
downsample video frames to resolution 160 ∗ 120 and then
crop each frame to 112 ∗ 112.
4.1.2 Implementation Details
We compare the following six methods:
• Naive Downsample: using raw RGB frames under
different down-sampling rates, following [1].
• Cropping-Face: detecting and cropping out faces from
RGB frames, following [16].
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Fig. 2. Target and Budget Task Performance Trade-off on SBU Dataset.
For Naive Downsample method, a larger marker means a larger down
sampling rate is adopted. For Ours-Kbeam method, a larger marker
means a larger K in algorithm 3. Neither model restarting nor model
ensemble is used.
• Cropping-Whole: detecting and cropping out whole
actor bodies from RGB frames, following [16].
• Ours-KL: as described in section 3.3.1.
• Ours-Entropy: as described in section 3.3.2.
• Ours-Kbeam: as described in section 3.3.3.
In all three algorithms 1-3, we set step sizes αT = 10−5,
αB = 10
−2, αD = 10−4, accuracy thresholds th1 = 85%,
th2 = 99% and max iter = 67. In algorithm 3, we set
d iter to be 30 and we tried K = 1, 2, 4, 8. In algorithm
4, we set restarting iter to be 100 and experimented with
M = 1, 2, 4, 8. MobileNet [28] with different depth multipli-
ers ranging from 0.6 to 0.44 are used as ensembled models.
Other hyper-parameters of algorithm 4 are identical with
those in algorithm 2. We set γ=2 in loss function 3 and use
Adam optimizer [36] to update all parameters. For Naive
Downsample method, we use down-sampling rate ranging
from 1 (i.e. no down-sampling) to 56.
4.1.3 Result Comparison and Discussion
We present the experimental results in figure 2, which dis-
plays the trade-off between the action recognition accuracy
AT and the actor pair recognition accuracy ANB . In order to
interpret this figure, we should note that a desirable trade-
off should incur minimal target accuracy AT (y-axis) while
reducing budget accuracy ANB (x-axis). Therefore, a point
closer to the top-left corner represents a degrade model with
more desirable performance. The magenta dotted line sug-
gests the target accuracy AT on original unprotected videos.
This can be roughly considered as the AT upper bound for
all privacy protection methods, under the assumption that
fD will unavoidably filter out some useful information for
the target task.
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As we can see, all three of our methods largely outper-
form the baselines. Crop-Face and Naive Downsample with
low downsample rate can lead to decent action accuracy,
but the budget accuracy ANB is still very high, meaning
these methods fail to protect privacy. On the other hand,
Crop-Whole and Naive Downsample with downsample
rate as high as 56 can effectively suppress ANB to a low
level, but AT also suffers a huge negative impact, which
means the degraded videos are of little practical utility. Our
methods, in constrast, achieves a great balance between
utility and privacy protection. Ours-Entropy and Ours-
Kbeam with K = 2 can both decrease ANB by around 30%
with nearly no harm on AT . Ours-KL and Ours-Kbeam
with K = 1, 4 achieve slightly worse trade-off compared
with Ours-Entropy, but they still largely outperforms the
baseline methods. Due to its ease of implementation and
low complexity, we use Ours-Entropy as the default option
in our framework, unless otherwise noted.
4.1.4 Effectiveness of Model Restarting and Ensemble
In this section, we add model restarting and model ensem-
ble to Ours-Entropy, as shown in algorithm 4, to further
improve the performance. Note that model restarting and
model ensemble can be easily combined with all three of our
methods, and we just pick Ours-Entropy here to show their
effectiveness. The results are shown in figure 3. As we can
see, using model restarting can suppress ANB much further,
with no additional harm on AT . Model ensemble also helps
to improve the trade-off.
4.2 Action Recognition on UCF101 with Multiple Pri-
vacy Attributes Protected: Cross-Dataset Training
4.2.1 Dataset and Problem Setting
UCF101 is an action recognition dataset with 13,320 real-life
human action videos collected from YouTube. It contains
videos of 101 different actions. We use official train-test
split for this dataset. Similar to what we did with SBU, we
spatially downsample and crop videos frames to 112 ∗ 112
resolution, and then we temporally clip the videos to video
clips with shape [T,W,H,C] = [16, 112, 112, 3]. The target
task T is to do human action recognition on UCF101, which
can be taken as a video classification task with 101 classes.
VISPR is a dataset with 22,167 images annotated with
68 privacy attributes, e.g. semi-nudity, hobbies, face, race,
gender, skin color and so on. Each attribute of an image is
labeled as ’present’ and ’non-present’ depending whether
the certain privacy attribute information is contained in the
image. We select 7 out of 68 attributes, which frequently
appear in UCF101 datasets and well fit the smart home
application settings, to protect in our experiment. That’s to
say, we only consider these 7 attributes during training and
evaluation. These 7 attributes are: semi-nudity, occupation,
hobbies, sports, personal relationship, social relationship
and safe. The budget task B is to predict privacy attributes
on VISPR dataset, which can be taken as a multi-label image
classification task (7 labels, each is a binary classification
task). We use class-based mean average precision (cMAP),
whose definition can be referred to [20], to measure the
performance of this budget task. Official train-test split is
used on VISPR dataset.
Fig. 4. Performance Trade-off on UCF-101/VISPR dataset.
4.2.2 Implementation Details
Experiments on SBU has shown Ours-Entropy achieves
slightly superior performance than Ours-KL and Ours-
kbeam, so we only compare Ours-Entropy with baseline
9methods on this dataset. In algorithm 4, we set step
sizes αT = 10−5, αB = 10−2, αD = 10−4, accuracy
thresholds th1 = 70%, th2 = 99% and max iter =
800, restarting iter = 100 and experimented with
M = 1, 2, 4, 8. Models from {ResNet-V1-50, ResNet-V2-50,
MobileNet-1.0, MobileNet-0.75} are used as {f iB}Mi=1. We set
γ = 0.5 in loss function 3 and use Adam optimizer to update
all parameters. For Naive Downsample method, we use four
different down-sampling rates: 1, 2, 4, 6.
4.2.3 Results Analyses
We present the experimental results in figure 4. Naive
Downsampling causes AT to drop dramatically while ANB
only drops a little bit, which means the utility of videos is
greatly damaged while the privacy information is hardly fil-
tered out. On the contrary, with the help of model restarting
and model ensemble, Ours-Entropy can decrease ANB by 7%
while keeping AT as high as we can get on the original un-
degraded videos, meaning the privacy is protected at almost
no cost on the utility. Hence, Ours-Entropy outperforms
Naive Downsampling in this experiment.
5 PA-HMDB51: A NEW BENCHMARK
5.1 Motivation
To the best of our knowledge, there is no public dataset
containing both human action and privacy attribute labels
on the same videos. The lack of available datasets has
not only made it difficult to employ a data driven joint
training method, but more importantly making it impossible
to directly evaluate the performance of a learned model to
keep privacy while not harming utility on a single dataset.
To solve this problem, we annotate and present the very
first human action video dataset with privacy attributes
labeled, named PA-HMDB51 (Privacy Attribute HMDB51).
We evaluate our method on this newly built dataset and
further demonstrate our method’s effectiveness.
5.2 Selecting and Annoating Privacy Attributes
A recent work [20] has defined 68 privacy attributes which
could be disclosed by images. However, most of them
seldom make occurrence in public human action datasets.
We carefully selected 7 privacy attributes which are most
relevant to our smart home settings, out of 68 attributes
from [20]. These seven attributes are: skin color, gender,
face (partial), face (complete), nudity, personal relationship
and social circle. We further combined those 7 attributes
into 5 to better fit the human action videos: combine ”face
(partial)” and ”face (complete)” into one attribute ”face” and
combine ”personal relationship” and ”social circle” into ”re-
lationship”. To this end, we have got five privacy attributes
which widely appear in public human action datasets and
are closely relevant to our smart home setting. The detailed
description of each attribute and their possible ground truth
values and their corresponding meaning are listed in table
1.
Privacy attributes may vary during the video clip. For
example, in some frames we may see a person’s full face,
while in next frames the person may turn around and the
face is no longer visible. We therefore decide to label all
privacy attributes for each frame.
The annotation of privacy labels was manually per-
formed by a group of students at the CSE department of
Texas A&M University. Each video was at least annotated
by three individuals, and then cross-checked.
5.3 HMBD51 as the Data Source
Now that we have defined the five privacy attributes, we
need to identify a source of human action videos to label.
There are a number of choices available, such as [33],
[34], [37]–[39]. We choose HMDB51 [34] to label privacy
attributes, since it consists of more diverse privacy infor-
mation, especially nudity/semi-nudity.
We provide frame-level annotation of the selected 5
privacy attributes on 592 videos selected from HMDB51.
In this paper, we treat all 592 videos as testing samples;
however, we do not exclude the future possibility to use
them for training.
5.4 Dataset Statistics
5.4.1 Action Distribution
When selecting videos from HMDB51 dataset, we consider
two criteria on action labels. First, the action labels should
be as balanced. Second (and more implicitly), we select more
videos with non-trivial privacy labels. For example, ”brush
hair” action contains many videos with ”semi-nudity” at-
tribute; ”drink” action contains many videos with ”can tell
relationship” attribute. Despite their practical importance,
the two privacy attributes are relatively less seen in the
entire HMDB51 dataset, so we tend to select more videos
with the two attributes, regardless of their action classes.
The resultant distribution of action labels are depicted in
Figure 5, showing a relative class balanace.
5.4.2 Privacy Attribute Distribution
We try to make the label distribution for each attribute as
balanced as possible by manually selecting those videos
containing uncommon privacy attribute values in original
HMDB51 to label. For instance, videos with semi-nudity are
overall uncommon, so we deliberately select those videos
containing semi-nudity into our PA-HMDB51 dataset. Peo-
ple are sensitive about releasing their privacy to the public,
so the privacy attributes are highly unbalanced in any
public video datasets by natural. Although we have used
this method to try to relief this problem, the PA-HMDB51
is still unbalanced. Figure 6 shows the frame-level label
distribution of all five privacy attributes. We can see the
videos with ”cannot tell gender” and ”cannot tell skin color”
still take a very small portion in the whole dataset.
Note that the total frame number of each privacy at-
tribute is different since some vague frames may not be
labeled with some certain attribute(s). For example, in some
frame, it is hard to tell whether the face is complete or partial
(it is somewhere in between), but you can tell the skin color
of the actor in all those frames. In this situation, we would
not label ’face’ attribute on those vague frames but would
still label ’skin color’ attribute.
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5.4.3 Action-Attribute Correlation
If there is a strong correlation between a privacy attribute
and an action, it would be harder to remove the privacy
information from the videos without much harm of the
action recognition task. For example, we would expect high
correlation between ’gender’ and the action ’brush hair’,
since this action is carried our much more often by female
than by male. Figure 7 shows the correlation between pri-
vacy attributes and actions.
5.5 Benchmark Results on PA-HMDB51
5.5.1 Dataset and Problem Setting
We train our models using cross-dataset training on
HMDB51 and VISPR datasets as we did in section 4.2, except
that we use the five attributes defined in Table 1 on VISPR
instead of the seven used in section 4.2. The trained models
are directly evaluated on PA-HMDB51 dataset for both
target task T and budget task B,without any re-training or
adaptation. We use the rest videos in HMDB51 not included
in PA-HMDB51 as training set. Similar with the UCF101
experiments, the target task T (i.e. action recognition) can
be taken as a video classification problem with 51 classes,
and the budget task B (i.e. privacy attribute prediction) can
be taken as a multi-label image classification task with two
classes for each privacy attribute label. Notably, although
PA-HMDB51 has provided concrete multi-class labels with
specific privacy attribute classes, we convert them into
binary labels during testing. For example, for “gender”
attribute, we have provided ground truth labels “male”,
“female” and “cannot tell”, but we only use “can tell” and
“cannot tell” in our experiments, via combining “male” and
“female” into the one class of “can tell”. This is because
we have to keep the testing protocol on PA-HMDB51 in
consistency with the training protocol on VISPR (a multi-
label, “either-or” type binary classification task, so that our
models cross-trained on UCF101-VISPR can be evaluated
directly. Meanwhile, We hope to extend training to PA-
HMDB51 in the future, so that the budget task as a multi-
label can be formulated and evaluated as a multi-label,
multi-classification problem.
The inputs X to our framework are clips of shape
[T,W,H,C] = [16, 112, 112, 3], just the same as in the
SBU and UCF101 experiments. All implementation details
are identical with the UCF101 case, except that we adjust
th1 = 0.7 and th2 = 0.95.
5.5.2 Results and Analysis
The results of Ours-KL method with M = 1, 4 (with and
without restarting) and naive downsampling method with
downsample rates 1, 4, 8, 28 are shown in figure 8. Our
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Fig. 7. Action-PA correlation in PA-HMDB51 dataset. The color represents the number of frames of each action containing a specific privacy attribute
value. For example, in the ”relationship” subplot, the intersection block of row ”Exist” and column ”kiss” shows the number of frames with ”relationship
exist” label in all kiss videos.
methods achieve much better privacy-utility trade-off com-
pared with baseline methods. When M = 4, our methods
are able to decrease privacy cMAP by around 8% with little
harm on utility accuracy. Overall, the privacy gains are more
limited compared to the previous two experiments, because
no (re-)training is performed; but the overall comparison
trends show the same consistency.
6 CONCLUSION
We proposed an innovative framework to solve the newly-
established task of privacy-preserving visual recognition.
To tackle the challenging adversarial learning process, we
investigate three different optimization schemes. To fur-
ther tackle the ∀ challenge of universal privacy protection,
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TABLE 1
Attribute Definition on PA-HMDB51 Dataset
Attribute Possible Values Meaning
Skin Color
0 invisible Skin color of the actor is invisible.
1 white Skin color of the actor is white.
2 brown/yellow Skin color of the actor is brown/yellow.
3 black Skin color of the actor is black.
Face
0 No face Less than 10% of the actor’s face is visible.
1 Partial face Less than 70% but more than 10% of the actor’s face is visible.
2 Whole face More than 70% of the actor’s face is visible.
Gender
0 Cannot tell Cannot tell the person’s gender.
1 Male It’s an actor.
2 Female It’s an actress.
Nudity
0 The actor/actress is wearing long sleeves and pants.
1 The actor/actress is wearing short sleeves or shorts/short skirts.
2 The actor/actress is of semi-nudity.
Relationship
0 Cannot tell Relationships (such as friends, couples, etc.) between the actors/actress cannot be told from the video.
1 Can tell Relationships between the actors/actress can be told from the video.
TABLE 2
Attribute Definition on PA-HMDB51 Dataset
Frame Action Privacy Attributes
Brush hair
• skin color: white
• face: no
• gender: female
• nudity: level 2
• relationship: no
Pullup
• skin color: white
• face: whole
• gender: male
• nudity: level 1
• relationship: no
we proposed model restarting and ensemble, which are
shown to further improve the obtained trade-off. Various
simulations confirmed the effectiveness of this proposal
framework. Last but not least, we establish the very first
dataset for privacy-preserving video action recognition, an
effort that we hope could engage a broader community into
this research direction.
We note there being a large room to improve the pro-
posed framework before it can achieve practical usefulness.
For example, the definition of privacy leakage risk is core to
13
Fig. 8. Performance trade-off on PA-HMDB51 dataset.
the framework. Considering the ∀ challenge, current LB de-
fined with any specific fB is insufficient; the budget model
ensemble could be only viewed as a rough discretized
approximation of P . More elegant ways to model this ∀ op-
timization may lead to further performance breakthroughs.
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